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THE PENNSYLVANIA ATTACK ON
RACKETEERS IN LEGITIMATE ENTERPRISES
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, organized crime has been associated with illegal
gambling, loan sharking, illegal narcotics and liquor traffic, and
prostitution.' While organized crime continues to garner large
sums of money from these activities,2 it has now become a major
factor in another area; organized crime has gone legitimate.
The incursion of organized crime into legitimate enterprises
has been reported for many years. Only recently has the true
extent of this infiltration become known.3 The Pennsylvania Crime
Commission through the course of its investigations compiled a list
of over 357 legitimate businesses which were in varying degrees
involved with criminal syndicates. 4 Organized crime does not limit
its activities to specific areas of legitimate business; however, there
are a few basic categories of business in which a criminal syndicate
is most likely to be involved: jukeboxes and vending machines,
restaurants and taprooms, confectionaries and cigar stores, and the
garment industry.5
There are many reasons why organized crime has decided to
become involved in legitimate business, including providing a re-
spectable "cover"; a base of operation to deal with political leaders
and public officials; a means of "washing" illegal income, and as a
hedge against unfavorable conditions in the criminal world.6
In an effort to provide an effective means of removing the in-
fluence of organized crime from legitimate enterprises, Pennsyl-
vania, enacted "The Pennsylvania Corrupt Organization Act of
1970."17 The legislation came in the wake of reports on organized
crime by both state8 and national9 commissions and is similar to
1. See PENNSYLVANIA CRIME COMMISSION, REPORT ON ORGANIZED
CRIME, 25-47 (1970) [hereinafter cited as CRIME COMMIssIoN REPORT];
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUsTIcE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME, 2-4 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
2.
3. TASK FORCE REPORT at 4.
4. CRIME ComIssION REPORT at 49.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 3921-29 (1970).
8. CRIMIVE COMMISSION REPORT.
9. TASK FORCE REPORT.
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Title IX of the Federal Organized Crime Control Act.10 The new
Pennsylvania Crimes Code repeals the 1970 Corrupt Organiza-
tion Act and reenacts it in substantially identical form in section
911 of the new Crimes Code." Paralleling Title IX of the Federal
Organized Crime Control Act, 12 section 911 dealing with Corrupt
Organizations, provides both criminal'8 and civil' 4 remedies to the
State and expands the investigatory powers of government by
providing for the use of civil investigative demands. 5 The Penn-
sylvania law does not expressly allow civil actions by private indi-
viduals"8 who may be injured by racketeer control of legitimate
business, nor does section 911 provide for forfeiture, to the govern-
ment 7 following conviction of violations of the criminal prohibi-
tions of the act, of any interests which were derived from a "pat-
tern of racketeering acitvity." Although the two omissions noted
above will place an added burden on the state and local govern-
ments in enforcement of section 911, and warrant further legisla-
tive consideration, this Comment will deal with section 911 as en-
acted, noting the problems and possibilities in regard to its use in
eliminating the spectre of organized crime from legitimate busi-
ness.
I. CRITMNAL PROHMBmONS
Prohibited activities under section 911(b) are divided into
three specified areas and a fourth which prohibits conspiracies' s
to violate those three enumerated categories. The specific prohi-
bitions include the investment of income derived from a pattern
of racketeering activity in any enterprise, 9 gaining control or in-
terest in any enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity,
20
and engaging in the conduct of any enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity.2' A pattern of racketeering activity is defined
as two or more acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred
10. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1970).
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911 (Supp. 1973).
12. See note 10 supra.
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(b) (Supp. 1973).
14. Id. § 911(d).
15. Id. § 911(f).
16. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1970).
17. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1), (2) (1970).
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(b) (4) (Supp. 1973); see also PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 903 (Supp. 1973) (criminal conspiracy).
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(b) (1) (Supp. 1973); an investment
in open market securities is allowed up to 1% of outstanding shares if
such purchase does not give the power to elect one or more directors.
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(b) (2) (Supp. 1973).
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911 (b) (3) (Supp. 1973).
after the effective date of the section.2 2 Racketeering activity is
defined as acts indictable under certain enumerated sections of the
new crimes code,23 offenses indictable under section 20(d) of "The
Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act,"2 4 conspiracy to commit any of the
above offenses,2 5 and the collection of an unlawful debt.26 The
enumerated offenses are those generally associated with the sources
from which organized crime derives its income and those offenses
of violence and intimidation which could be used to gain control
of an enterprise.27 As noted, the coverage of the prohibited activi-
ties subsection is broad enough to encompass traditional activities
used by organized crime in an effort to infiltrate legitimate enter-
prise; however, portions of the prohibited activities subsection may
be open to attack on constitutional grounds.
A. Pattern Of Racketeering Activity
Section 911 defines a pattern of racketeering activity as a
course of conduct requiring two or more acts of racketeering activ-
ity28 one of which occurred after the effective date of the sec-
tion.29 This definition presents the possibility that a prosecution
under subsection 911(b) may come under attack as an ex post facto
law, ° in the instance where the pattern is established by an act of
racketeering activity subsequent to the effective date of the act,
coupled with one or more acts of racketeering activity prior to the
effective date of the act.
It should first be noted that the pattern of racketeering activ-
ity is not the activity which is being prohibited, 1 but rather places
a person in the class of persons to whom the subsection 911(b)
activities are prohibited. Though at first glance an analogy may be
attempted between the status created by a pattern of racketeering
activity and that created by recidivist statutes, which have been
held not to constitute ex post facto laws,32 such analogy fails. Recid-
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(h) (4) (Supp. 1973).
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(h) (1) (i) (Supp. 1973). The list is
quite comprehensive and will not be set forth.
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(h) (1) (ii) (Supp. 1973). See also
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780-20(d) (Supp. 1973) (making it a felony to
sell, dispense, or give away narcotic drugs); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780-2
(g) (Supp. 1973) (defining narcotic drugs).
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(h) (1) (iii) (Supp. 1973).
26. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(h) (1) (iv) (Supp. 1973), an unlaw-
ful debt is defined as one which resulted from lending money or property
at an effective rate of interest greater than 25% per year.
27. CRIME COMMIssION REPORT at 60.
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(h) (1) (Supp. 1973).
29. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(h) (4) (Supp. 1973).
30. Ex post facto laws are prohibited by Article I, Clause 17 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. PA. CONST. art. I, § 17.
31. Section 911 (b) (1-3) prohibits investment in, control of, or
conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.
Conspiracy to commit any of the prohibited activities is also penalized
under § 911(b) (4). PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(b) (Supp. 1973).
32. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948); David v. Bennett, 400 F.2d
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ivist statutes go only to the punishment to be attached to the latest
offense.83  Prior crimes are taken into account only to determine
the punishment for the offense for which the accused is currently
being tried,3 4 prior convictions being viewed as having brought the
defendant within a class established by law as deserving and re-
quiring a more severe punishment and restraint than would other-
wise be received.3 5 The prohibited conduct which is penalized by
subsection 911 (b) is not the latest act of racketeering activity by
the defendant, but rather a course of conduct which is legally dis-
tinct from the acts of racketeering activity.86 The acts of racke-
teering activity are used only to establish that the defendant is a
member of a class to which certain seemingly legal activities are
prohibited because the defendant has been shown to be engaged in
a pattern of racketeering activity. Since the subsection does not
deal with the sentence imposed on the defendant for his latest act
of racketeering activity as determined by his prior racketeering
activity, an analogy to recidivist statutes, in an attempt to find
the statute not violative of the prohibition against ex post facto laws,
is not in point.
The types of laws which are prohibited as ex posto facto were
defined by the Supreme Court in Calder v. BuI137 as falling into
four categories:
1st. Every law that makes an action does before the
passing of the law, and which was innocent when done,
criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that ag-
gravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when com-
mitted. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and
inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the
crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the
legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different,
testimony, than the law required at the time of the com-
mission of the offence, in order to convict the offender.
38
Since it is the activities enumerated in 911(b) which are punished
rather than the acts of racketeering activity, 911 (b) is not ex post
facto if the activity punished occurred after the effective date of
279 (8th Cir. 1968); Commonwealth ex rel. Foster v. Ashe, 336 Pa. 238,
8 A.2d 542 (1939).
33. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948); Davis v. Bennett,
400 F.2d 279, 281 (9th Cir. 1968).
34. Commonwealth ex rel. Foster v. Ashe, 336 Pa. 238, 240, 8 A.2d
542, 543 (1939).
35. State v. Rowe, 181 A. 706, 710 (N.J. 1935).
36. See note 26 supra.
37. 3 U.S.386 (1798).
38. Id. at 390.
the act. For those acts occurring after the effective date, the de-
gree of the crime and the punishment are prescribed before the
crime is committed3 9
Although 911(b) is not an ex post facto law it may, when all
but one of the acts of racketeering activity used to establish the
pattern of racketeering activity occurred prior to the effective
date of the statute, be viewed as a retroactive law.40 Retroactive
laws are not prohibited by the constitution. 41 It has been recog-
nized by the courts, that although in general laws should not be
retroactive, there are cases when they may justly and for the bene-
fit of the community relate to a time prior to their enactment.42
It is submitted that the possible retroactive application of the
definition of pattern of racketeering activity falls into the com-
munity interest justification for retroactive laws. As noted by the
court in Cases v. United States,43 in upholding the Federal Firearms
Act 44 against an ex post facto attack:
[I] f past conduct which is made the test of the right to
engage in some activity in the future is not the kind of
conduct which indicates unfitness to participate in the ac-
tivity, it will be assumed, as it must be, that the purpose
of the statute is to impose an additional penalty for past
conduct. If, however, the past conduct can reasonably be
said to indicate unfitness to engage in the future activity
the assumption will be otherwise.
45
If the legislature is by statute regulating conduct which it has the
power to regulate, the statute is not ex post facto even if the con-
duct is made to depend on past behavior, even behavior which oc-
curred before the passage of the statute.
40
B. Statutory Presumption of Investment
Subsection 911(b)(1), dealing with investment of money de-
rived from a pattern of racketeering activity, provides that:
[I] f, in any proceeding involving an alleged investment
in violation of this subsection, it is established that over
39. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(c) (Supp. 1973).
40. Retroactive laws have been defined as those which take away or
impair vested rights acquired under existing laws, or create a new obliga-
tion, impose a new duty, or attack a new disability in respect to transac-
tions or considerations already past. Lucas v. Murphy, 348 Mo. 1078,
156 S.W.2d 686, 690 (1941). Under § 911(b) a person's right to invest in,
control or conduct the activities of an enterprise may be forfeited due to
acts which have placed him in the class of people who are engaged in a
pattern of racketeering activity.
41. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 391 (1798).
42. Id.
43. 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 902(e, f) (1940). The act makes it a crime for one
previously convicted of a crime of violence to ship or receive a firearm
via interstate commerce.
45. 131 F.2d 916, 921 (1st Cir. 1942).
46. Id.; United States v. Donofrio, 450 F.2d 1054, 1056 (5th Cir. 1971)
(rev'd on other grounds).
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half of the defendant's aggregate income for a period of
two or more years immediately preceding such investment
was derived from a pattern of racketeering activity, a re-
buttable presumption shall arise that such investment in-
cluded income derived from such pattern of racketeering
activity.
47
The use of statutory presumptions such as the above in crimi-
nal cases has come under judicial scrutiny in recent years, most
notably in connection with federal narcotics laws.48 The presump-
tion is most traditionally used where the government, due to the
nature of the presumed fact,49 or the accessibility of evidence of the
presumed fact,50 can prove the presumed fact only when inferences
are allowed to be drawn from the proof of some other fact. The
investment presumption prescribed by subsection 911 (b) (1) eases
the severity of the problem inherent in tracing money through the
complex structure of organized crime to its ultimate investment. 51
However, it should be noted that this in itself will not be sufficient
to validate the presumption.
In Tot v. United States5 2 the Supreme Court rejected com-
parative convenience in proving a fact as a test to determine the
validity of a criminal presumption. 53 Tot established rational con-
nection as the controlling test in determining the validity of a stat-
utory presumption, noting that comparative convenience in pro-
ducing the evidence of the presumed fact was only a corollary argu-
ment which would be admissible only after the rational connection
test had been overcome. 54 For a criminal presumption to be valid
under the Tot test there must be a rational connection between
the fact which is proved and the fact which is to be presumed.
Where the inference to be made from the proven fact does not
47. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(b) (1) (Supp. 1973). No such pre-
sumption is present in Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act,
supra, note 4.
48. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970); Leary v. United
States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
49. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970) (knowledge that
drug imported presumed from possession of drug); Leary v. United States,
395-U.S. 6 (1969) (same).
50. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965) (illegal possession of
a still presumed from unexplained presence at the site); Tot v. United
States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943) (receipt of firearm through interstate commerce
after effective date of statute presumed from possession of firearm by one
previous convicted of a violent crime).
51. McKeon, The Incursion By Organized Crime Into Legitimate
Business, 20 J. PuB. L. 117, 123 (1970).
52. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
53. Id. at 469.
54. Id. at 467.
reasonably bear a relationship to the ordinary circumstances of
life, the statutory presumption cannot be upheld.55 More recently
the Supreme Court in Leary v. United States5 6 defined the rational
connection test in the terms of "more-likely-than-not." Pursuant
to this definition, it must be shown that the presumed fact is more
likely than not to be true given the proven fact on which it is made
to depend.
57
In determining the validity of the presumption, the central is-
sue is whether, given the fact that more than half of the defend-
ant's income for the preceding two or more years has been derived
in an illegal manner, it is more likely than not that some of that
illegally derived income was used to make the investment which is
the subject of the proceeding. No formula exists which provides
an easy answer to the question; the answer depends on a judicial
weighing of the facts on which the presumption is based. In con-
sideration of this problem the Supreme Court in United States v.
Gainey5" said:
The process of making the determination of rationality
is, by its nature, highly empirical, and in matters not within
specialized judicial competence or completely commonplace,
significant weight should be accorded the capacity of Con-
gress to amass the stuff of actual experience and cull con-
clusions from it.59
Assuming, arguendo, that the factual basis exists to permit
the presumption of subsection 911(b) (1) based on the more-likely-
than-not test, other problems exist when its use is allowed in a
criminal proceeding.
As noted by Justice Black in his dissent to Turner v. United
States,60 "Congress can undoubtedly create crimes and define their
elements, but it cannot under our Constitution even partially re-
move from the prosecution the burden of proving at trial each of
the elements it has defined."' Under subsection 911(b) (1) proof
of investment of illegally derived income is an essential element
of the crime, as such under traditional criminal law standards the
burden is placed upon the prosecution to prove this element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.6 2 In this regard, the "more-
likely-than-not" test has been interpreted to require that proof
of the validity of the presumption need be proved only by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.68 The Supreme Court in both Leary
55. Id. at 468.
56. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
57. Id. at 36.
58. 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
59. Id. at 67.
60. 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
61. Id. at 429.
62. 30 Am. JuR. 2d Evidence § 1170 (1967).
63. United States v. Vallejo, 312 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd,
438 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1971).
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
and Turner recognized the possibility that the validity of a statu-
tory presumption in a criminal case may have to meet the burden
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,64 but the question was not de-
cided in either case. Arguably, the rebuttable presumption of in-
vestment creates only an inference that such investment has ac-
tually occurred and the prosecution is still required to prove its
case beyond a reasonable doubt, the trier of fact being free to reject
the inference of investment.6 5 It is questionable, however, whether
either an interpretation of the presumption as non-conclusive, or
the rebuttable nature of the presumption will place the burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt upon the prosecution.
The wide range of publicity from all branches of the media with
respect to the evils of organized crime can reasonably be expected
to weigh heavily against a defendant who has been associated at
trial with illegal income and a pattern of racketeering activity.
Therefore if the inference, though not conclusive, goes unrebutted
by the defendant, he must risk conviction where the prosecution
has produced only the presumption as evidence of the investment
element of the crime.
66
Forcing the defendant to rebut the presumption or risk the
weight given the presumption by the trier of fact results in addi-
tional problems, in effect the defendant is given an offer he can't re-
fuse. By taking the stand to rebut the presumption the accused is
placed in the position of having to prove his innocence, thereby
creating a conflict between the accused's substantive right to a pre-
sumption of innocence and the presumption created by statute.
67
Additionally, because the basic fact must be proven before
the presumption arises, in order to rebut the presumption the ac-
cused may have to show that his illegal income was invested in areas
other than the investment charged. Such a situation could bring
about two results. First as noted in Tot,68 where the court dealt
with a presumption of receipt of a firearm in interstate commerce
after the effective date of the statute, on proof that the accused had
possession of the firearm and was obviously convicted of a violent
crime:
64. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 416 (1970); Leary v. United
States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969).
65. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 70 (1965).
66. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 429 (1970) (Black, J., dis-
senting); United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 72 (1965) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting).
67. People v. Gazulis, 29 Misc. 2d 939, 212 N.Y.S.2d 910 (Poughkeepsie
City Ct. 1961).
68. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
If the presumption warrants conviction unless the de-
fendant comes forward with evidence in explanation and if,
as is necessarily true, such evidence must be credited by
the jury if the presumption is to be rebutted, the defend-
ant is under the handicap, if he takes the stand of ad-
mitting prior conviction of violent crimes. His evidence
. .. is thus discredited in the eyes of the jury before it is
given.69
As applied to the presumption in subsection 911 (b) (1), the defend-
ant would be forced to admit that he had derived income from ille-
gal sources, and in an effort to rebut the presumption find it neces-
sary to disclose other investments made with the illegally derived
income.
This latter point would in effect force the accused to incrimi-
nate himself as to other violations of subsection 911(b) (1). This
was discussed in the dissenting opinions to both Turner70 and
Gainey.7 ' Justice Black, in Turner, reasoned that presumptions tend
to coerce the accused to take the witness stand in violation of his
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.72 The defend-
ant's privilege being fulfilled "only when the person is guaranteed
'the right ... to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the un-
fettered exercise of his own will .... , ,,73
II. CML REMEDIES
In addition to criminal penalties, section 911 also provides civil
remedies which can be used to attack the infiltration of organized
crime into legitimate enterprises.7 4 The civil remedies are provided
by granting equitable jurisdiction 75 to the courts of common pleas
and the Commonwealth Court 78 to prevent and restrain violations
of the prohibitions of subsection 911(b). The remedies avail-
able 77 under subsection 911(d) may be used in addition to the
criminal penalty, 78 or as an alternative to prosecution under sub-
69. Id. at 470.
70. 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
71. 380 U.S. 63 (1970).
72. 396 U.S. 398. 432 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 433, citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
74. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911 (d) (Supp. 1973).
75. The Commonwealth Court has jurisdiction only as provided by
law. PA. CONST. art. 5, § 4. The courts of common pleas are granted
original jurisdiction in all cases except as otherwise provided by law.
PA. CONST. art. 5, § 5.
76. The commonwealth court came into- existence in Pennsylvania on
January 1, 1970. PA. CONST. sched. art. 5, § 3. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17,
§§ 211.1 et seq. (1962). The commonwealth court is given all powers of
a court of common pleas (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 211.8(h) (1962) ), and
its original jurisdiction is limited to civil actions where either the Com-
monwealth or any officer of the Commonwealth is a party (PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17, § 211.401 (1962) ).
77. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(d) (i), (ii) (Supp. 1973).
78. A criminal conviction under subsection 911(b) estops the de-
fendant from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in
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section 911(b). Proceedings under subsection 911(d) are governed
in the main by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 9 and the
courts are explicitly given the authority to enter preliminary or
special injunctions, or take such other action as it may deem neces-
sary pending a final determination of the civil suit on the merits.
80
A. Pennsylvania Equity and Subsection 911 (d).
Under the Constitution of Pennsylvania, equity jurisdiction is
specifically conferred by statute upon the courts.8' Without the
specific grant of jurisdiction provided by subsection 911(d), an ac-
tion in equity to restrain or prevent violations of subsection 911(b)
would be allowable only if it could be shown that such equitable
powers had been granted the court.82 Arguably it could be said
that the courts of common pleas had the authority to restrain such
actions under the equitable jurisdiction granted them to restrain
acts contrary to law and prejudicial to community interests or the
rights of individuals.8 3 Such a construction of the equitable powers
possessed by the courts of common pleas could provide for civil
actions by parties other than the State Attorney General 4 to re-
strain or prevent injuries resulting from violations of subsection
911(b).8s  Parties bringing suit under this construction would be
required to show that they were injured by the activities which
were contrary to law and that they have no adequate remedy
at law.8 Since most injuries which individuals would sustain due
to the prohibited activities would be economic and therefore com-
pensable in money damages, a more likely basis for an individual
to gain equity jurisdiction would be the multiplicity of suits which
would be required if the prohibited activity is allowed to continue.
87
proceeding under subsection 911(d). PA. STAT. ANx. tit. 18, § 911(d) (3)
(Supp. 1973).
79. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(d) (4) (Supp. 1973); see PA. R.
Civ. P.
80. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(d) (2) (Supp. 1973).
81. PA. CONST. art. 5, §§ 2-5. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 281-302
(1962) (concerning equitable powers of courts); note 71, supra (powers
of the Commonwealth Court).
82. Calabrese v. Collier Township Municipal Authority, 430 Pa. 289,
296, 240 A.2d 544, 547 (1968).
83. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 282, 283 (1962). See Pennsylvania
Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Bravo Enterprises, Inc.,
428 Pa. 350, 360, 237 A.2d 342, 348 (1968).
84. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(e) (1) (Supp. 1973).
85. Such an action is provided for by Title IX of the Federal Or-
ganized Crime Control Act, note 10 supra.
86. 27 Am. Jus. 2d Equity § 86 (1966).
87. Pennsylvania Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Bravo
Allowing this remedy to private parties would give added power to
section 911 and allow the full force of the law to come to bear
against the forces of organized crime in legitimate enterprise.
A further aspect of applying equitable remedies to the enforce-
ment of section 911 should be noted. It has generally been held
in Pennsylvania that equity will not enjoin the commission of a
crime.88 Though this would seem to oust the use of equity as an
alternative to criminal prosecution, an exception to the general
rule has been recognized.8 9 The courts will grant injunctive relief
when the penalty provided by statute is not adequate to resolve
the injury to the complaining party.9 0 Despite the fact that a
penalty was provided by statute, the exception has been used in
Pennsylvania to enjoin the illegal practice of law,
91 and dentistry,92
racial discrimination,93 and violations of the Drug, Device, and
Cosmetics Act.9 4 Equity will not enjoin the commission of a crime
merely to enforce the criminal law. Under section 911 if criminal
prosecution alone will not remedy the evil, equity has jurisdiction
to insure a complete remedy.9 5
B. Antitrust Comparison.
The primary thrust of subsection 911(d) is to remove organized
crime from legitimate enterprises. In describing this purpose as it
related to Title IX of the Federal Organized Crime Control Act,90
Senator John L. McClellan said:
The first step in cleaning up an organization will be to
require the mob to divest itself of its holdings in legitimate
endeavors, where its members have abused the right by
condemned practices. In some cases, the organization will
no doubt be so corrupt that it will have to be dissolved.
Once the mob is removed, an injunction against it ever
again entering that particular type of organization should
prove effective to prevent its return to corrupt anew.
9 7
Enterprises, Inc., 428 Pa. 350, 358, 237 A.2d 342, 346 (1968); Martin v.
Baldy, 249 Pa. 253, 259, 94 A. 1091, 1093 (1915).
88. Commonwealth ex rel. Costa v. Boley, 441 Pa. 495, 500, 272 A.2d
905, 908 (1971); Diamond v. Diamond, 372 Pa. 562, 563, 94 A.2d 569, 570
(1953).
89. Commonwealth ex rel. Costa v. Boley, 441 Pa. 495, 500, 272 A.2d
905, 908 (1971); Everett v. Harron, 380 Pa. 123, 129, 110 A.2d 383, 386
(1955).
90. Id.
91. Ginsburg v. Korvak, 392 Pa. 143, 139 A.2d 889, cert. denied, 358
U.S. 52 (1958).
92. Boggs v. Werner, 372 Pa. 312, 94 A.2d 50 (1953).
93. Everett v. Harron, 380 Pa. 123, 110 A.2d 383 (1955).
94. Commonwealth ex rel. Costa v. Boley, 441 Pa. 495, 272 A.2d 905
(1971).
95. See note 89 supra.
96. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1970).
97. McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (5.30) or Its Critics: Which
Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NoTRa DAME L. REV. 55, 142 (1970).
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The steps involved in this process involve not only traditional equi-
table remedies, but new ones which have been developed by the
courts in antitrust litigation.98
Both section 911 and antitrust laws seek to accomplish basi-
cally the same result: the elimination of certain practices and con-
ditions which are deemed detrimental to the economic health of the
society. 99 With this in mind, a look at remedies used in the anti-
trust field will help circumscribe means which are available to
enforce subsection 911(d).
The purpose of equitable relief in the antitrust field is not to
punish for past conduct, but rather to eliminate the conditions
created by past misconduct and prohibit that conduct in the fu-
ture.10 0 The theory of antitrust relief is closely allied to the equi-
table notion of preventing unjust enrichment.10 1
The initial step in antitrust relief is eliminating the illegal con-
dition that exists. In this area, the courts have ordered businesses
to divest themselves of interests in other business, 10 2 individuals
to divest themselves of stocks of a company, 0 3 as well as the dis-
solution of the business. 10 4 The fact that private interests may be
adversely affected has been viewed as secondary to the court's duty
to decree relief effective to redress the violation. 0 5 Applied to
subsection 911 (d), the courts would use this initial step to remove
the racketeering influence from the legitimate business, particu-
larly when the influence was achieved through investment in the
enterprise.
Of possibly greater importance in both the antitrust and or-
ganized crime field, is the use of the prohibitory injunction to pre-
vent a recurrence of the violation. It has been noted that the courts
in forming decrees may not create new duties which have not been
prescribed by the legislature; may not in the future place the defend-
ants in a class different from other people; and may not issue de-
crees which enjoin all possible violations of the law.106 Were the
98. Id. at 141.
99. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(a) (Supp. 1973) (findings of fact).
100. Flynn, A Survey of Injunctive Relief Under State and Federal
Antitrust Laws, 1967 UTAH L. REv. 344, 349 (1967).
101. Id. at 352.
102. United States v. El Paso Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); United
States v. Grinnell, 237 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964), aff'd and remanded,
384 U.S. 563 (1966).
103. Hughes v. United States, 342 U.S. 353 (1952).
104. Id.; Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
105. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316,
326 (1961).
106. See note 100 supra at 351.
courts allowed to issue broad injunctions restraining violations of
all laws, they would in effect be subjecting a party to summary
contempt proceedings in addition to the criminal penalties which
could be imposed for the illegal act itself.10 7 The injunction then
must relate to activities which are an integral part of the conduct
sought to be prohibited and not merely to unrelated illegal activ-
ity. Once the relation is shown however, the injunction may be
used to prevent possible future violations of the prohibited activ-
ity.
08
Adequate relief in the antitrust field is based upon the premise
that the relief should end the illegal activity, deprive the defend-
ants of any benefits derived from the illegal activity, and break up
or render impotent the power which caused the violation. 109 With
this premise in mind and with a view toward the remedies formu-
lated in the antitrust arena, the courts of Pennsylvania have the
guidelines necessary to ensure that the objectives of section 911
are attained.
III. AIDs To ENFORCEMENT
The primary power and duty to enforce the provisions of sec-
tion 911 are given to the Attorney General of Pennsylvania.' 10 The
Attorney General is given concurrent authority with the county
district attorneys to institute criminal proceedings under the sec-
tion;"' in area of the civil remedies available under section 911,
however, enforcement is delegated exclusively to the Attorney
General. 12 Two supplementary aids to enforcement which have
been vested in the Attorney General will be discussed below.
A. Civil Investigative Demand.
Section 911(f) 113 authorizes the Attorney General to issue and
serve civil investigative demands requiring the production of docu-
mentary material, relevant to a racketeering investigation, 114 upon
any person or enterprise he reasonably believes to be in possession
of such material. The requisites of such demand and the procedures
to be followed when it is used are set forth in the section." 0 The
107. Commonwealth ex rel. Costa v .Boley, 441 Pa. 495, 501, 272 A.2d
905, 909 (1971).
108. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 400 (1972).
109. United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 577 (1966); Schine Chain
Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 128 (1948).
110. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(e) (1) (Supp. 1973).
111. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(e)(2) (Supp. 1973).
112. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(e) (Supp. 1973).
113. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(f) (Supp. 1973).
114. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(h) (6) (Supp. 1973). The racke-
teering investigation may be commenced either to uncover violations of
§ 911 or violations of court orders previously made pursuant to a proceed-
ing under § 911.
115. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(f) (2-10) (Supp. 1973).
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primary limitation placed upon the use of the civil investigative
demand is that it must not contain any requirement which would
be held unreasonable if contained in subpoena duces tecum. 11
Persons or enterprises served with the civil investigative demand
are provided the right to challenge such demand based on any con-
stitutional or legal right or privilege. 117 The two basic grounds for
an attack on a civil investigative demand are (1) a violation of the
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination' 8 and (2) a vio-
lation of the fourth amendment right against illegal searches and
seizures."19
The key to a determination of legality of a search and seizure
under a civil investigative demand is reasonableness. Compelling
the production of materials under penalty for refusal will be viola-
tive of the constitutional right against illegal search and seizure
unless it is confined to the proper limits. 120 The fourth amend-
ment however, will not interfere with the power to compel pro-
duction of documentary material pursuant to a civil investigative
demand so long as the scope of the demand is reasonable.' 2 ' Rea-
sonableness of a search and seizure depends on the relevancy of the
material being sought. 122 The civil investigative demand should
be voided or modified by the courts in those situations where the
Attorney General cannot show that the items which he seeks to
have produced are germane to the racketeering investigation.'
23
By analogy to the subpoena duces tecum, the demand should not
merely be a "fishing expedition" by which the Attorney General
hopes to find information which would show violations of section
911.124
116. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(f) (3) (i) (Supp. 1973).
117. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911 (f) (8) (Supp. 1973).
118. U.S. CONST. amend. V; PA. CONST. art. I, § 9. The self-incrimina-
tion challenge to the civil investigative demand is dealt with inferentially
in the section of this Comment dealing with the immunity provisions of
§ 911. It should be noted however that the fifth amendment does not
protect corporations against self-incrimination through the mandatory
production of documents. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,
321 U.S. 707, 726 (1944).
119. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; PA. CONST. art. I, § 8.
120. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 621 (1886); Annenberg v.
Roberts, 333 Pa. 203, 213, 2 A.2d 612, 617 (1938).
121. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 727
(1944); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 72, 72-73 (1906).
122. Annenberg v. Roberts, 333 Pa. 203, 213, 2 A.2d 612, 617 (1938).
123. Id. See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911 (f) (8) (Supp. 1973)
(authorizing courts of common pleas to set aside or modify a civil in-
vestigative demand).
124. See City of York v. Pa. Public Utility Commission, 3 Pa. Com-
monwealth Ct. 270, 278, 281 A.2d 261, 265 .(1971); American Car & Foundry
Co. v. Alexandria Water Co., 221 Pa. 529, 535, 70 A. 867, 869 (1908).
A comparison with Rule 4011 of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Civil Procedure 12 5 provides guidelines which may be applicable in
determining what limitations should be placed upon a civil investi-
gative demand. Under the guidelines of Rule 4011, demands would
not be allowed if they were sought in bad faith; caused unreason-
able annoyance, expense or oppression; related to privileged mat-
ters; or would require the party on which the demand is served
to make an unreasonable investigation.12 6 It should be noted how-
ever, that a corporation has been held not to be entitled to the
same degree of protection from searches and seizures as an indi-
vidual.
121
The sufficiency of the designation of materials to be produced
is determined by the circumstances of each case.1 2 8  The general
rule applied to demands for the production of documents is that the
demand must specify with some reasonable degree of certainty
and particularity the documents sought to have produced. 129 The
courts in dealing with specific challenges to a civil investigative de-
mand issued pursuant to subsection 911 (f) must weigh the rights
of the challenging party against the specificity which should rea-
sonably be required under all the circumstances involved before
it rules on the validity of the demand. It is submitted that where
a demand is defective because overly broad in scope, the objectives
of section 911 will more readily be accomplished if the demand is
modified rather than set aside.
B. Immunity
Due to the intricate infrastructure of organized crime,130 situa-
tions will develop where the information sought pursuant to enforce-
ment of section 911 will be available only from one who can refuse
to give such information based on the fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination.' 3' Prior to the enactment of section 911, these
situations were dealt with by invoking the provisions of the Act of
November 22, 1968 (No. 333) ,132 which allowed the Attorney General
to petition the courts to grant immunity to any person who is
shown to be necessary to a proceeding relating to organized crime
or racketeering. 13 3 The Act provides that:
125. PA. R. Cxv. P. 4011 (relating to limitations on the scope of dis-
covery and inspection).
126. Id.
127. Stahl v. First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 411 Pa. 121, 126, 191 A.2d
386, 389 (1963).
128. See generally 23 A.L.R.2d 856 (1952).
129. Annenberg v. Roberts, 333 Pa. 203, 2 A.2d 612 (1938); American
Car & Foundry Co. v. Alexandria Water Co., 221 Pa. 529, 70 A. 867 (1908).
130. See generally CRIME COMMISSION REPORT (1970).
131. See note 113 supra.
132. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 640.1 (Supp. 1973).
133. Under the act organized crime and racketeering include, but are
not limited to, conspiracy to commit murder, bribery, or extortion, nar-
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No such witness shall be prosecuted or subjected to any
penalty or forfeiture nor shall there be any liability on
the part of and no cause of action of any nature shall
arise against any such witness for or on account of any
transaction matter or thing concerning which he is com-
pelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-in-
crimination, to testify or produce evidence, nor shall
testimony so compelled be used as evidence in any crimi-
nal proceeding against him in any court.'
3'
Section 911 incorporates this immunity statute into its provisions,
and authorizes a grant of immunity in instances where it is
deemed necessary to compel compliance with a civil investigative
demand, or to compel a person to testify or produce evidence in pro-
ceedings relating to the civil remedies provided in the act.13 5 This
grant of immunity is not as broad as that provided under the Act
of 1968.
A person granted immunity pursuant to the provisions of
section 911(g) cannot plead that immunity as a defense to proceed-
ings brought against him to invoke the civil remedies available
under section 911.130 Such express limitation was made neces-
sary by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Riccobene
Appeal.
137
The court, in Riccobene stated that only criminal prosecutions
and criminal liability need be protected by a grant of immunity;138
noting that "[f] ear of public disgrace or personal danger or civil
liability are not adequate constitutional or legal grounds to success-
fully invoke the privilege and protection of immunity .... -131
The Pennsylvania Immunity Act, however, provides that no cause
of action of any nature shall arise against any witness granted
immunity. 140 Based on this wording, the court, in Riccobene, in-
terpreted the statute as granting immunity from civil liability.
141
By expressly providing that a grant of immunity pursuant to sub-
section 911(g) cannot be pleaded as a defense to civil proceedings
brought pursuant to section 911, the Legislature has avoided the un-
cotic or dangerous drug violations, prostitution, usury, subornation of per-
jury and lottery, bookmaking or other forms of organized gambling.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 640.6 (Supp. 1973).
134. PA. STAT. AN. tit. 19, § 640.3 (Supp. 1973) (emphasis added).
135. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(g) (Supp. 1973).
136. Id.; see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(d) (Supp. 1973) (civil reme-
dies).
137. 439 Pa. 404, 268 A.2d 104 (1970).
138. Id. at 413, 268 A.2d at 110, citing Piemonte v. United States, 367
U.S. 556 (1961); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
139. 439 Pa. 404, 413, 268 A.2d 104, 110 (1970).
140. See note 129 supra.
141. 439 Pa. 404, 413, 268 A.2d 104, 110 (1970).
necessarily broad language contained in the Pennsylvania Immu-
nity Act.
It would appear, however, that should the Attorney General
find it necessary to grant immunity to a witness for a purpose other
than compelling compliance with a civil investigative demand, or
compelling testimony or the production of evidence in a civil pro-
ceeding under subsection 911(d), the Pennsylvania Immunity Act,
as enacted, would need to be invoked. 142  Such a witness would
therefore be immune from a subsequent civil cause of action pur-
suant to section 911(d), where such subsequent action related to
any transaction, matter or thing concerning which the witness was
compelled to testify.
148
The court in Riccobene held that the Pennsylvania Immunity
Act provided "transactional" immunity to persons granted immu-
nity.144 "Transactional" immunity precludes the prosecution of the
individual to whom immunity is granted for any transaction con-
cerning which his testimony was compelled, regardless of the source
of the information which would be used for the subsequent prose-
cution.145 Inherent in the broad scope of "transactional" immu-
nity, is the narrower concept of "use" immunity, which forbids only
the use of the compelled testimony or evidence obtained from leads
provided by the compelled testimony.' 46 By incorporating the
Pennsylvania Immunity Act into section 911,141 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's holding that the act provides "transactional" im-
munity must be held applicable to situations where immunity is
granted.
The granting of "transactional" immunity is contrary to the
recommendations of the Pennsylvania Crime Commission Report,
wherein it was recommended that the Pennsylvania Immunity Act
be replaced by a comprehensive statute which would grant only
"use" immunity.14  The Crime Commission's analysis that "use"
immunity would be constitutionally sufficient,149 has been affirmed
recently by the Supreme Court in Kastigar v. United States.50 In
Kastigar, the Court, held that "immunity from use and derivative
use is co-extensive with the scope of the privilege against self-
142. Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(g) (Supp. 1973) (limiting
granting of immunity under the subsection to securing compliance with a
civil investigative demand and proceeding to obtain the civil remedies
available under subsection 911 (d) ) with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 640.1
(Supp. 1973) (allowing a grant of immunity in a proceeding relating to
organized crime or racketeering before a court).
143. See note 141 and accompanying text supra.
144. 439 Pa. 404, 412, 268 A.2d 104, 109 (1970).
145. Id.; Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 434 (1956); Brown v.
Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 608 (1896).
146. Id.
147. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(g) (Supp. 1973).
148. CRIME CoMMIssIoN REPORT at 106 (1970).
149. Id.
150. 406 U.S. 441 (1972)..
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incrimination, and therefore is sufficient to compel testimony over
a claim of privilege."'151 If following a grant of "use" immunity
a person is subjected to criminal prosecution based upon matters to
which his compelled testimony related, the burden is affirmatively
placed upon the prosecution to show that its evidence has been
derived from sources wholly independent of the compelled testi-
mony.'
52
Although the burden placed upon the prosecution to prove
independent sources of evidence will, in all but a limited number
of situations, 5 3 effectively transform "use" immunity into "trans-
actional" immunity, the furtherance of a legislative policy should
not be hindered in even that small degree by the grant of a privi-
lege broader than constitutionally necessary.
IV. CONCLUSION
There can be little doubt of the pervasive influence which
organized crime has on legitimate enterprise, and the adverse ef-
fect which this influence imparts on the state economic picture.
Section 911 represents one of the first affirmative efforts by a
state legislature to alleviate the problem. The effectiveness of
this legislation depends first upon the efforts of law enforcement
agencies to enforce its sanctions and second the judicial construction
given the statute.
As previously mentioned, a statute identical to section 911 has
been in force in Pennsylvania since 1970; however, the courts have
never examined validity of its various provisions. The author has
herein dealt with only a small number of the considerations with
which the courts may ultimately be confronted as they attempt to
construe the provisions of section 911 in such a way as will sup-
press the evil which the statute attacks and advance the remedies
provided by the Legislature.
The validity of the statutory presumption of investment pro-
vided in subsection 911 (b) (1) will necessitate a determination by
the court of the factual basis for the presumption. 54 While under
present authority only the more-likely-than-not test need be applied,
serious consideration must be given the possibility that this stand-
ard does not meet the necessary requirements for a criminal prose-
151. Id. at 453.
152. Id. at 460.
153. A probable situation, in which the prosecution could overcome its
burden of affirmatively showing that evidence was obtained from a source
independent of the compelled testimony, occurs when the evidence was
gathered prior to the time the witness was granted immunity.
154. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
cution.155 The possible retroactive nature of the definition of pat-
tern of racketeering activity does not violate the prohibition
against ex post facto laws, 156 and justification of its retroactive na-
ture exists when it is weighed against the community interest
sought to be promoted. In the area of civil remedies the courts
are given their most important power to promote the policies en-
compassed by the statute. By reference to general equitable prin-
ciples and decisions in the antitrust arena, the courts can form
decrees which eliminate the illegal activities and assure against
their future occurrence. 157 Guidelines for the issuance of a civil
investigative demand are set forth in the statute. In dealing with
such demands, the courts should assume that the guidelines are fol-
lowed, but should not require such unreasonable specificity in the
demand itself as would negate its use as an aid to enforcement. 158
The immunity provisions of section 911 present more a problem
of confusion and unnecessarily broad grants of immunity, than
problems of interpretation.' 59 The preferred course of action would
be a new immunity statute restricted to only "use" immunity and
eliminating any possibility of immunity from civil liability.
Section 911 does not expressly provide for private civil actions,
nor does it provide for forfeiture of illegally obtained interests fol-
lowing conviction of a "pattern of racketeering activity."''10 The
omission of these provisions may somewhat limit the effectiveness
of section 911. Without private civil action, the full burden for
penalizing corrupt influence of legitimate business falls upon
state and local police forces, both of which have proved ineffective
in past efforts to deal with organized crime.' 0 ' Omission of for-
feiture as an additional criminal sanction, has created the necessity
of following a criminal conviction under section 911 with a de novo
civil suit to divest the racketeer of any interest or control which he
maintains in legitimate enterprises.
Yet the solutions envisioned by the Legislature when it en-
acted the corrupt organizations statute are not really to be found
in the statute itself. It is not the statute, but rather the law en-
forcement agencies which must ultimately seek to extricate from
legitimate enterprise the ever increasing influence of organized
crime. The Legislature has taken a great step in providing a plan
and the tools to make the plan work; but the success of the project
has now passed to the hands of others.
JOHN P. MANBECK
155. See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
156. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
157. See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
158. See note 120 and accompanying text supra.
159. See note 135 and accompanying text supra.
160. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
161. CRIME COMMISSION REPORT at 77.
